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Abstract: This study proposes a personal fuel permit trading scheme to limit the total 
consumption of motor fuels (including diesel and gasoline), thus reducing its 
environmental impact. We studied the effectiveness of this scheme by analyzing the 
permit demand of a benchmark gasoline-driven vehicle in transportation sector. A 
general utility optimization model is formulated and a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
is further assumed to analyze the response of permit demand to its price changes with 
the Slutsky decomposition of price effects. The results, when defined in economic 
terms, indicate that the permit demand of consumers in higher income groups are 
negatively related to permit price; permit demand are also negatively related to permit 
price for consumers in medium income groups, but with positive income effect; and 
the direct relationship between permit demand of lower income groups and the price 
is defined as a Giffen-good effect. That is, for those low income groups, when the 
permit price rises their demand for permits would also increase. Then a US household 
expenditure data is used to show illustrative results if a pilot of personal fuel permit 
trading scheme. Further, some regulations on critical parameters, such as permit 
allocation and permit prices in the policy design are proposed to make the scheme 
feasible in different income groups. Based on these results, implications, limitation 
and suggestions for future study are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Personal fuel permit trading; Permit demand; Price effect; Private 
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In the last decade, petroleum consumption in the world has risen by 8% from the 
year of 2005 to 2013 (EIA, 2015). The USA has contributed to 33.5% in the world 
petroleum consumption in 2013 (EIA, 2015). Among several other sectors, 
transportation sector ranks the first, consuming almost 70% of petroleum in 2013 (see 
figure 1) and the increasing ownership of vehicles is the main driving force (EIA, 
2015). While vehicles provide convenience, comfortability and personal identity, they 
would also bring about unwanted side effects such as exhausting non-renewable 
energy source, air pollution, congestion, and other negative externalities (Verhoef, 
1994; Santos et al., 2010). 
 
To alleviate these negative effects, and particularly to mitigate climate change, 
several regulatory policies and technological upgrading have been proposed to 
manage these non-point sources. For instance, in the United States, the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard is a policy instrument that aims at 
decreasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and foreign dependence on oil, but it is 
uncertain that whether fuel savings would exceed the cost of fuel economy standards 
(Dreyer et al., 2015). In China, purchase restrictions and traffic restrictions based on 
even- and odd-numbers of license plates have been launched in some pilot cities. 
However, in the long run, as proved in the Mexican case by Davis (2008), such 
policies may cause a sharp increase in the demand of old, cheap and high-polluting 
second-hand cars (Mahendra, 2008). Debates are still going over the adoption of 
hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) and electric vehicles (EV) , which are emerging as 
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alternatives to the traditional internal combusted engine vehicles (Faria et al., 2013). 
The limitation of charging infrastructure, long recharging time and high maintenance 
costs make it difficult to popularize them (Hannan et al., 2014; Efroymson et al., 
2013). 
Researchers have gradually shifted their focus of reducing transport emissions to 
market-based regulatory policies. Personal carbon trading (PCT) is an extension of 
emission trading schemes in upstream industrial sectors to individuals. It is a “cap and 
trade” scheme aims to deliver carbon emissions reduction with minimal costs 
(Fleming, 1997; Hillman et al., 2008). Specifically, personal carbon allowance mainly 
focuses on household and individual emitters (Roberts and Thumin, 2006; Harwatt et 
al., 2011). Further, more specific frameworks are proposed to curb emissions and 
manage mobility in transportation sector. Yang and Wang (2011) proposed tradable 
travel credits for mobility management and carbon abatement and investigated the 
resulting state of transportation system. Aziz et al. (2015) came up with the notion of 
personal mobility credit allowance scheme for personal travel and investigated its 
effectiveness using an experimental game. 
The above schemes are of great advantages in abatement certainty by capping 
the emission cap and revenue neutrality by redistributing wealth between 
under-emitters and over-emitters (Aziz et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015). They are more 
effective in stimulating consumers’ behavior than fuel tax system where a certain 
price is levied (Bristow et al. 2010). However, the permit price is determined by the 
demand and supply in the permit market, which is of uncertainty (Starkey, 2012). This 
uncertainty can be a source of positive feelings and arousal, which stimulates people 
to invest more time, effort and money in considering energy-saving behavior (Shen et 
al., 2014). Moreover, permits may be viewed as a form of complementary currencies 
(CCs) which are used alongside conventional currency to solve environmental 
problems (Seyfang et al., 2007). 
As shown in a personal carbon trading (PCT) scheme, transport fuels have low 
emission alternatives and relatively high demand elasticity among the various energy 
carriers (Ramanathan, 1999) and should be regulated at first. In most developed 
countries, the demand for transport fuels can be reduced through switching to public 
transportation where is available and easily accessible. For residents in cases that 
there is no sufficient public transportation, the fuel consumption still could be reduced 
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through reduction of travels. For instance, residents could choose to join in the 
“car-sharing” activity (Efthymiou et al., 2013) or adopt electric vehicles (Tamor et al., 
2013). Moreover, there are large amount of low carbon alternatives to gasoline and 
diesel, such as bioethanol and biodiesel, which have been used in many parts of the 
world. Therefore, it is feasible and essential to build a specific “cap and trade” system 
to regulate the abundant use of transport fuels. 
This paper proposes a new notion of personal fuel permit trading (PFPT) scheme 
as a means of implementing PCT. It will cap the total carbon emissions from transport 
fuels and thus the total demand of liquid fossil fuels. The permit price in this scheme 
would serve to offset the costs of externalities of fossil fuels. Such a trading scheme 
would minimize the cost of compliance (Braun et al., 2015). We aim to explore 
whether such a PFPT scheme may generate effective behavioral changes among 
consumers and gain insight into policy design. This idea has not been proposed 
elsewhere.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next session introduces 
the concept of personal fuel permit trading scheme. Section 3 constructs a general 
utility optimization model and analyses the price effects of PFPT. Section 4 assumes 
specific Cobb-Douglas utility function, and on this basis investigates consumers’ 
demand for fuel permits in different income groups. Section 5 studies several critical 
parameters in this policy design, such as consumers’ income, initial permit allocation, 
and permit price and fuel economy based on the US household expenditure survey. 
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses the implications and limitations. 
 
 
2. Personal fuel permit trading scheme 
2.1 The feasibility of PFPT scheme 
PFPT scheme is proposed as a branch of PCT, which specifically regulates 
carbon emissions generated by fuel consumption. Several studies have demonstrated 
the feasibility of PCT scheme (Starkey, 2012; Fan et al., 2015). The PFPT scheme is 
technically and institutionally feasible. First, the driver registration records are 
available in the transportation sector and thus could be used as the base for allocating 
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the credits. Second, the refueling cards registered to specific vehicles are available, 
which can also be used to record information of gasoline permits. With the rapid 
development of mobile Internet, permits could be traded through mobile phone based 
platforms. Thus, the costs of constructing and maintaining such a scheme are not 
likely to be high.  
The enforcement of such a scheme requires an initial government guidance, 
which could be established gradually. The fuel credits would be issued and withdrawn 
under the regulation of the authority in the set-up of PFPT scheme. And the credit 
price should also be regulated within a reasonable range. For instance, the “ceiling” 
and “floor” price mechanisms (Fankhauser & Hepburn, 2010) in European Emissions 
Trading Scheme could be adopted in the PFPT scheme design. In a centrally planned 
economy such as China, it is easier to enforce such a policy from top to bottom. 
While in a free and open market such as the US, the pilot cities or demonstration 
zones should be established to initialize the PFPT scheme until it could be accepted in 
the broader areas. This feasibility of this scheme in a market economy could be 
demonstrated by the emission trading systems in developed countries.  
 
 
2.2 Define of the scope of regulated fuels  
 
Among the petroleum products in the transportation sector, it is better to focus on 
gasoline and diesel initially. These two products have contributed approximately 80% 
of the total consumption in the transportation sector (see Figure 2). The third major, 
jet fuel, has different characteristics than diesel and gasoline, which makes it hard to 
cause leakage of regulating transport fuels if it is not regulated. However, the scheme 
is capable of incorporating the jet fuels because there are only a few, but large 
consumers. 
 
6 / 29 
 
 
Figure 2 US transportation sector petroleum consumption in 2013 (Source: EIA 
2015) 
 
2.3 Define the unit of permits 
 
The unit of permits should be defined as 1 litter of gasoline equivalent (LOGE) 
in terms of carbon emissions. According to EIA (2015), the ratio of emission intensity 
between gasoline and diesel is about 0.88 (19.64 pounds/gallon vs. 22.38 pounds) 1 
and thus 1 litter of diesel is equivalent to 1.16 LOGE. Biofuels are considered as 
zero-emission sources and thus transport fuels containing biofuels could have lower 
LOGE. Each petrol station should publish LOGEs of each type of fuels, which 
subjects to regulatory approval.  
 
2.4 Define the scope of regulated vehicles  
 
According to EIA (2015), vehicles are classified into several categories: 
⋅ Passenger vehicles, including Private cars, heavy trucks, and public 
transportation (not include metro and train). The public transportation could be 
subsidized later, but not directly link to petrol consumption to avoid leakage;  
                                                 
1http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=307&t=11 
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⋅ Motorcycles, if included, should be allocated the amount of permit allowance 
in a proportion to its fuel consumption compared with the benchmark car.  
⋅ Electric vehicles: These zero-emission vehicles are included so as to provide 
additional incentive for their adoption among consumers.  
The government may also set minimal fuel standards for the regulated vehicles 
that are eligible for receiving initial free permits. Those vehicles that fall below such 
standard will not be qualified for receiving initial free permits.  
 
 
2.5 Determine the annual total amount of fuel permits to be issued  
 
To avoid mass objections and resistances when implementing the PFPG scheme, 
certain pilots or demonstration zones should be established first. The amount of 
targeted fuel consumption that may be different in each year, which is then translated 
into the total number of LOGE permits. The percentage of LOGE permits that will be 
freely distributed should also be determined according to the reduction target and the 
projection growth of vehicle ownership. A public consultation for determining the 
amount of total and free distributed permits would be recommended to increase public 
acceptance.   
Not all the amount of permits has to be freely allocated. Governments could 
remain certain amount for trading when the prices are deemed too high or new 
vehicles are purchased. In contrast, the permit prices are too low, the government can 
buy back to avoid crash of the permit market.  
2.6 Allocate permits to individual car owners 
Similar to the PCT scheme, it is a critical issue to determine the amount of the 
initial permit allocation for each vehicle driver in the PFPT scheme. In the PCT 
scheme, most scholars argued for the egalitarian principle of equity, which is 
consistent with the international proposal “contraction and convergence” (Meyer, 
2000; Fawcett, 2004; Wadud, 2011). Following this principle, we assume an equal per 
capital permit allocation as our starting point. 
Each regulated vehicles should have a permit account and the free permits will 
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be deposited into the account. The account should be transferred to the new owners 
when a vehicle is sold. A new vehicle is eligible to claim amount of free permits in 
pro rata. The EVs should also be allocated standard amount of allowance, the sales of 
which could provide additional economic incentives for electric vehicles. 
 
2.7 Operation rule of PFPT scheme 
 
When the regulated vehicle drivers purchase gasoline from petrol stations, they 
should surrender corresponding permits (LOGEs). The number of LOGEs would then 
be deducted from the drivers’ account held on a permit debit card electronically. 
Petrol stations should also surrender corresponding permits for their fuel sales to the 
regulating authority. Drivers could store permits or sell the extra permits to the market 
voluntarily. Drivers who consume more than their allocated credits (called an 
“over-consumer”) have to buy credits from the consumers who consume less (called 
an “under-consumer”). Such transactions can be done through various Internet 
platforms.  
 
3. Model development 
 
In this section, we take a standard gasoline-driven vehicle owner as an example 
and formulate the utility optimization model that subjects to income constraint and 
available permit constraint. Then according to the Slutsky-Hicks theory of 
value(Allen and Hicks, 1934), the effect of permit price change on demand could be 
divided into two parts-that due to change in real income (income effect) and that due 
to change in relative prices with real income constant (the substitution effect). On this 
basis, permit demand will be analyzed. 
 
3.1 Model formulation 
 
The consumer with private vehicles would make decisions upon vehicle miles 
traveled meanwhile being mind of their gasoline consumption due to the gasoline 
permit cap (Glover, 2011). This decision-making process can be framed as a 
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budgeting process which may encourage self-control over one’s gasoline consumption 
through basic economic mechanisms (Parag and Strickland, 2009).  
The model is based on the utility theory of consumer choice that a consumer 
would make decisions upon consumption bundles to achieve utility maximization 
(Houthakker, 1950). And it is assumed that consumers in this model are homogenous 
similar to the assumption in Parry (2004). We consider that a consumer would be 
confronted with consumption decisions on vehicle miles traveled m  and other 
general consumption good x  (Parry and Small, 2005; Capstick and Lewis, 2009; 
Parry and Timilsina, 2010). m would emit carbon emissions directly. As previously 
noted, other consumption goods x will not cost gasoline permit because the emission 
reduction scheme should first cover the transport-generated carbon emissions due to 
its relatively high demand elasticities similar to the PCT scheme (Wadud, 2011; Raux 
et al., 2015). Moreover, the indirect carbon emissions from goods x  are difficult to 
track and measure (Eyre, 2010), and therefore are excluded from the PFPT scheme. 
Under such a scheme, consumers have not only been subject to monetary budget but 
also permit budget when they purchase gasoline from the petrol station. We assume 
that consumers under the scheme are price-takers. Symbolically, 






















                
(1) 
where ( , )u m x represents a consumer’s general utility function, m  is vehicle miles 








∑ is levelized vehicle purchased cost, Gp  is gasoline price, g  is the gasoline 
consumption per mile, gp  is gasoline permit price, and ψ  is the gasoline permit 
traded. If 0ψ > , the consumer is an over-consumer; Conversely, if 0ψ < , the 
consumer is an under-consumer. Let w  (LOGE) denote the free permit allocation 







p gm c g
=
+ ∑  denotes the expenditure on vehicles, xp x  denotes the expenditure 
on general consumption good and gpψ  denotes the expenditure on allowances. The 
sum of these expenditure should be no more than the consumers’ disposable income.  
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In the second constraint, gm  signifies the permit needed to travel m miles for the 
consumer, which should be no more than the sum of the permit allocated and the 
permit traded (ψ w+ ).  
 
3.2 Further analysis  





G g x g
t
p g gp m P X I p cw g
=
+ + ≤ + − ∑









P p g gp W I p cw g
=
= + = + − ∑ , we have 
xPm P x W+ ≤                                                      (3) 
where G gP p p g= +  is the total price and W  is the total income budget. We 
define equation (3) as the total income budget constraint.  
In order to explore the effect of permit price on permit demand, we should derive 
the partial derivative of ψ  with respect to gp . According to the constraint condition 
of equation (1), we have 
( , , ) ( , , )x xP p W gm P p Wψ w= −                                          (4) 
Deriving the partial derivative of equation (4) with respect to gp , we obtain 
( , , ) / ( , , ) /x g x gP p W p g m P p W pψ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂                                  (5) 
Thus, to obtain the effect of permit price on its demand we should first 
investigate the effect of permit price on vehicle miles traveled. Based on equations (1) 
and (3), we define the indirect utility function (Van Praag, 1991; Mas-Colell et al., 
1995), ( , , )xv P P W  as the highest level of utility the consumer could reach if he faced 
prices P  and xP  and budgetW . Thus we have 
( , , ) / ( / )( / ) ( / )( / )x g g gv P P W p v P P p v W W p∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂                   (6) 
Using Roy's identity (Newey, 2007), we obtain 
/ Wv P v m∂ ∂ = −                                                      (7) 
Thus, we have 
( , , ) /x g W W Wv P P W p v mg v vw ψ∂ ∂ = − + = −  (8) 
According to the Duality Theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), we have  
( , , ) ( , ( , , ))x xm P P W h P v P P W=                                          (9) 
where ( , , )xm P P W is the Marshallian demand function, and ( , ( , , ))xh P v P P W  is 
the Hicksian demand function. 
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Deriving the partial derivative of equation (9) with respect toW and gp , we have 
( , , )W x v Wm P P W h v=                                                  (10) 
1( , , ) / ( / )( / ) ( / )( / ) /x g g g v gm P p W p h P P p h v v p h g h v p∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = + ∂ ∂     (11) 
Substituting equations (8) and (10) into equation (11), we have 
1( , , ) / ( , , )x g W xm P p W p h g m P p W ψ∂ ∂ = −                                 (12) 
The equation (12) is the Slutsky decomposition of permit price effect on vehicle 
miles traveled. Substituting equation (12) into equation (5), we derive 
1( , , ) / ( , , ) / [ ( , , ) ]x g x g W xP p W p g m P p W p g h g m P p Wψ ψ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = −            (13) 
Deriving the partial derivative of equation (4) with respect toW , we have 
( , , ) ( , , ) 1/W x W x gP p W gm P p W pψ = −                                    (14) 
Substituting equation (14) into equation (13), we have 
2
1( , , ) / ( , , ) / [ ( , , ) 1/ ]x g x g W x gP p W p g m P p W p g h P p W pψ ψ ψ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = − +       (15)                                
According to the consumer behavior theory (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), equation 
(10) is the Slutsky decomposition of permit price effect on permit demand. The 
substitution effect (SE) and income effect (IE) can be represented as 
2
1SE g h=                                                          (16) 
[ ( , , ) 1/ ]W x gIE P p W pψ ψ= +                                          (17) 
 
4. Example with a specific utility function 
 
We will use a classical Cobb-Douglas utility function to obtain the specific 
formulae of the price effect, substitution effect and income effect, given that the 
consumer choice models with Cobb-Douglas utility function are simple and tractable 
and can generate clear and testable empirical predictions (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 
1983; Heffetz, 2007). Assume that the utility function ( , )u m x  takes the form of 
Cobb-Douglas function 1m xα α− .The constraints and parameters in this specific model 
are similar to those in the general model. Thus, the utility maximization problem can 


























                
(18) 
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The shadow prices 1φ  and 2φ  are defined as the marginal changes in the 
objective function with respect to an increase in the right-hand side of the constraint 
conditions. The constraints in the optimization problem (18) imply that the shadow 
prices are positive. Solving the problem in equation (18) involves a linear program of 
which Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are shown in Appendix A.  
 
4.1 Substitution effect 
 
According to (A.11), (A12) and (B8), we have 
2 1 2
1 ( / ) 0xSE g h U P P g
β ββ α β − −= = − <                                  (19) 
Where U  is the minimum utility level required by the consumer. We find that the 
substitution effect is always negative. According to Koutsoyannis (1963), the negative 
substitution effect is an inevitable consequence of the “preference hypothesis”. When 
a price increase occurs in one good, it would alter the relative prices and induce 
substitution of the relatively cheaper good for the relatively more expensive good. 
Likewise, when the permit price rises, consumers would tend to reduce gasoline 
consumption and turn to general good consumption. This is consistent with the 
traditional economic theory of consumer choice (Varian, 1992) 
 
4.2 Income effect analysis 
 
However, the income effect will be different for the under-consumer and the 
over-consumer. According to equations (A13), we have 
/ 1/W gg P pψ α= −                                                  (20) 
According to equation (17), the income effect is 
/IE g Pαψ= −                                                      (21) 
When the consumer is an over-consumer ( 0ψ > ), his income effect is negative. 
The real income will decrease with permit price rises and thus generating negative 
income effect. According to equations (15), (19) and (21), the consumer’s total price 
effect is negative. That is to say, the over-consumer’s permit demand will always 
decrease when the permit price increases. In a PFPT scheme, consumers should be 
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required to surrender a certain amount of permits when they consume gasoline. The 
energy goods and permits are complementary goods. When the permit price rises (i.e. 
total price rises), the over-consumer will consume less gasoline and then need fewer 
permits. Therefore, his permit demand will decrease as permit price rises. 
However, when the consumer is an under-consumer ( 0ψ < ), his income effect is 
positive, which makes the total price effect ambiguous. Koutsoyannis (1963) argued 
that, for the inferior goods, the income effect is positively related to the price change.2 
Intuitively, the allowances could be perceived as “inferior goods” by the 
under-consumers. However, the mechanism is different from that of conventional 
inferior goods. For conventional inferior goods, the mechanism is such that when the 
price of these goods rises, the consumer’s real income will fall and he will purchase 
more inferior goods (Baumol, 1973; Atkinson and Stern, 1974). In term of PFPT 
permits, when the price rises, the under-consumer’s real income will increase, since 
he could sell his surplus permits to gain extra income. Thus, the income effect is 
positive and the permits are somewhat like inferior goods for the under-consumer. 
 
4.3 Price effect 
 
To explore the price effect, we could compare the absolute values of the income 
effect and the substitution effect and investigate which plays a dominant role. 
Substituting equation (20) and (A13) into equation (17), we have 
1 2 2 2[ ( , , ) 1/ ]W x gIE P p W p g P g P Wψ ψ α w α
− −= + = − (21) 
According to equations (16), (B8), (A11) and (A12), we obtain 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
xSE WP g WP g WP gαβ α α
− − −= = −                                (22) 
According to equations (21) and (22), when ** *I I I< < , we have IE SE< (see 
more details in Appendix C).3  That is, the substitution effect dominates the income 
effect, and thus the total effect will be negative. In this situation, the permit demand of 
the under-consumer will decrease as the permit price rises. An under-consumer will 
                                                 








I P g c pw g w
=
= + −∑ , 
*
1





I P g c pw α g w
=
= + −∑  
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consume less gasoline when the permit price rises. Therefore, he will need fewer 
permits and can sell more.  
When **I I< , we have IE SE> . That is, the income term dominates the 
substitution term, and thus the price effect will be positive. In this situation, the permit 
demand will increase as the permit price increases. The observed supply pattern of 
permits might run counter to the second law of supply and demand, which states that 
a rise in price tends to increase supply (Henderson, 1922).  
In summary, the demand for gasoline permits among consumers with different 
income levels might be quite different. For the over-consumers, the substitution and 
income effect are both negative. Therefore, for over-consumers, they will demand less 
permits when the price rises. For the under-consumers with higher income 
( ** *I I I< < ), the substitution effect is negative while the income effect is positive. 
Furthermore, the negative substitution effect dominates the positive income effect, 
making gasoline permits somewhat like inferior good. For these two income groups 
( *I I> and ** *I I I< < ), the permit price will play a role in stimulating the less use of 
gasoline.  
For the under-consumers with lower income ( **I I< ), the positive income effect 
dominates the negative substitution effect. The permits are somewhat like Giffen 
goods for these consumers. These phenomena could be further explained by the 
superimposed effect of the price and the quantity of permits. When permit price rises, 
the under-consumers’ real income will also increase because a certain quantity of 
permits could be sold at higher prices. Thus, the income effect is positive although the 
mechanism is different from that of conventional inferior goods. Therefore, the 
“permit demand paradox” —some consumers would need more permits for surrender 
when the permit price rises—appears in the low income groups. Actually the main 
purpose of introducing a PFPT scheme is to provide an additional financial incentive 
for consumers to reduce gasoline consumption (Wallace et al., 2010). However, the 
Giffen-good effect in low income groups proves the ineffectiveness of a PFPT scheme 
theoretically. 
 
5. Data calibrations and discussion 
 
In this part, we will use the US household expenditure data to investigate the 
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heterogeneity of permit demand over different income groups and examine how to 
steer the policy design into an effective direction. The US data was chosen because it 
has the most comprehensive dataset that are public available. In addition, 
transportation sector has been one of the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions, 
which accounts for almost 28 percent of total emissions in 2012 (EIA, 2013). These 
carbon emissions are due to the widespread use of gasoline in private vehicles. 
Although apart from a national priority, environmental protection has been paid great 
attention among different states and private organizations. For example, best known 
cap-and-trade program in the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was established to 
promote low carbon transitions. PFPT scheme is another type of cap-and-trade 
program which extends the carbon reduction activity to individual fuel consumers. 
Besides, the data are used to show the results intuitively and it does not intend to 
explain the political reality in the USA. We also tried the calibration with data from 





Average household income I  and vehicle purchase cost c  are collected from 
the US household income quintiles (see Table 1). According to Mankiw (1998), α  
in the above utility function stands for the expenditure share of personal 
transportation. Generally, consumers in different income groups would have different 
revealed preference on personal transportation. Here we use the average private 
transportation expenditure share from year 2004 to 2013 in household expenditure 
survey (seen in Table 2) to estimate α  given that the aggregate data would satisfy 
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (Varian, 1992). After calibrations, we 
get =1.5%α . 
 
Table 1 
Average household income and vehicle purchase cost in 2013 
Quintile Average household income ($) Vehicle purchase cost ($) 
Lowest 20% 10,092 261 
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Second 20% 26,764 614 
Third 20% 43,592 1,194 
Fourth 20% 67,344 1,688 
Highest 20% 134,044 4,064 
Note: Vehicle purchase cost mainly refers to household average expenditure on new 
private vehicles (Second-hand vehicles are excluded) 
 
Based on a review of over 247 million U.S. car and light truck registrations in 
January, 2013, the average age has hit a record high of 11.4 years for passenger cars4. 
Therefore, we assume that the average lifespan T is 11 years. According to the 
estimates conducted by EPA (2008), the gasoline consumption per mile driven ( g ) is 
0.04 gallon and the carbon emission per gallon is 9.26kg. 
Table 2 







2013 8465.96  51093.41 
2012 8453.86  51420.37 
2011 7773.07  49666.24 
2010 7182.83  48089.61 
2009 7179.06  49068.62 
2008 8088.52  50465.32 
2007 8219.40  49633.47 
2006 8003.13  48381.80 
2005 7896.24  46398.22 
2004 7359.84  43373.02 
 
The current interest rate ( r ) is set to be 0.03 according of Bank of America5. The 
initial gasoline permit allocation is critical in the PFPT scheme, where an appropriate 
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permit allocation would cause market failure (Li et al., 2014). In 2012, total carbon 
emissions in transportation sector reached 1841.0 million metric tons in the USA. 
Among them, 43.1% are from private cars, reaching 793.8 million metric tons (EPA, 
2014). To be consistent with the abatement goal of “in the range of” 17 percent below 
2005 levels by 2020 pledged at the Copenhagen climate meeting in December 2009 
(Burtraw et al., 2011), the carbon budget for each consumer should be set at 
4753.80kg. Thus the initial gasoline permit allocation (w ) could be set at 513.37 
gallon.  
According to McNamara and Caulfield (2013) and Brauneis et al (2013), the 
carbon allowance price is set equal to 0.03 $/kg in the PCT scheme. Thus the gasoline 
permit price could be set equal to 0.27 ( 0.03 9.26× ) $/kg. The average price of 
gasoline around the world ( Gp ) is set to be 4.17 per us gallon according to the current 
price level. 
5.2 Permit demand and income  
 
Based on the parameters, we use equations (21), (22) and (15) to calculate the 
substitution effect, income effect and price effect and gain insight into permit demand 
in different income group. The specific calculation results are presented as follows 
(see in Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Income effect, substitution effect and price effect among different income 
groups 
 
Specifically, as indicated by Figure 3, the substitution effects of permit demand 
are all negative among different income groups. This is consistent with traditional 
hypothesis on substitution effect (Renshaw, 1960; Varian, 1992). Moreover, the 
substitution effect would be strong among higher income groups.  
In terms of income effect, the situation is a little different. In the lowest 20% 
quintile where the average income falls between ** 5583.87I =  and 
* 17550.52I = , 
the income effect is positive, consistent with the above model result. However, the 
negative substitution effect dominates the income effect, making permits inferior 
goods for low income groups. In the second, third, fourth, highest income quintiles, 
the consumers’ income effect are negative. Their average incomes are more 
than * 17550.52I = $, being over-consumers. These over-consumers would have to 
purchase extra permits for surrender (Fawcett, 2010). Thus the PFPT scheme is 
capable of playing the role of “income distribution”, that is, permits flow from 
under-consumers to over-consumers and in turn money flow from the high income 
groups to low income groups (Parag and Eyre, 2010; Li et al., 2014). 
Overall, for the lowest 20% quintile consumers, the permits are inferior goods, 
and for the second, third, fourth and highest 20% quintile consumers, the permits are 
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normal goods as shown in Figure 3. These consumers other than the lowest 20% 
quintile would be stimulated to reduce permit consumption under the PFPT scheme. 
Unlike as proved in Section 4.3, when a consumer’s income is below the critical 
value **I , his permit demand would be similar to Giffen good. However, the 
Giffen-good effect has disappeared from Figure 3. This is due to the fact that even the 
average income in the lowest 20% percentiles is far more than ** =5583.87I $. 
Therefore, in terms of the average incomes in the five quintiles, permits are never to 
be Giffen good, which indicates that “permit demand paradox” would only remain 
theoretically possible in the current parameter settings. For most people, the PFPT 
scheme is effective in reducing gasoline consumption, consistent with the conclusions 
in the PCT scheme drawn by Li et al. (2014) and Fan et al. (2015) 
 
5.3 Regulation on the permit price and permit allocation 
 
Using the US household expenditure data, we find that the PFPG scheme is 
ineffective among consumers in the lowest 20% quintiles. In the policy design, 
regulations could be enforced on the initial permit allocation and permit price to steer 
the scheme into an effective direction. If IE SE≤ , the permit demand would subject 
to the permit price control and the PFPT scheme would be effective. According to 
equations (21) and (22), we have /g Gp W pw≤ − . In the current parameter setting, the 
permit price for the lowest 20% income should be set no more than 9.05$/gallon to 
keep the PFPG scheme effective. Since the permit price is determined by the permit 
supply and permit demand, the regulatory department should issue and withdraw 
permits timely so as to maintain a reasonable market price. 
Permit allocation is another critical parameter that the regulatory department 
could exert influences upon the permit trading. As mentioned above, to keep the PFPT 
scheme effective in the lowest 20% quintile, we have IE SE≤ , that 
is
1





I c pw g
=
≤ − ∑ . In the current setting, the permit allocation should be kept at 
no more than 1594.46 kg for each regulated vehicle. 
 
5.4 Consumers’ choice on vehicles’ fuel economy (1/ g ) 
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Permit trading scheme will induce abatement activities and promote consumers’ 
transition toward the adoption of less polluted vehicles (Albrecht, 2000). In the PFPG 
scheme, consumers will have incentives to choose relatively high fuel economic cars 
to comply with the permit “cap”. Letting equation (A13) equal 0, we have the 
minimal fuel economy that consumers in different income group has to follow when 
they choose a gasoline-driven vehicle. Figure 4 indicates that only the lowest income 
group would choose the cars whose fuel economy below the average level. The rich 
are subject to more stringent fuel economy standard. This will provide reference for 
the regulatory department to set the minimal fuel economy that could provide free 
permits. And this scheme helps to raise the overall fuel economy standard in the US. 
 
Figure 4 Consumer’s choice on fuel economy and the US average fuel economy 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
 
This paper specifically proposes a PFPT scheme to implement PCT in the 
transportation sector. Then the paper investigates the effectiveness of the PFPT 
scheme in reducing gasoline consumption from the perspective of permit demand 
across different income groups and studies several critical factors in the policy design.  
The results suggest that permit demand would be varied among different income 
groups. For high income groups, gasoline permits are normal goods with negative 
income effect and substitution effect. For medium income groups under consumers, 
permits could be somewhat like inferior good with negative substitution effect and 
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positive income effect. In this situation, the positive income effect is not strong 
enough to dominate the negative substitution effect, making the price effect remain 
negative. While for low income groups, the positive income effect dominates the 
negative substitution effect, thus resulting in a Giffen-good effect.  
Yet this Giffen-good effect remains theoretically possible and will not happen in 
the real US situation. In reality, the results for the low income group are largely 
depending on the parameter settings in the scheme, for example, the free permit 
allocated, permit prices etc. To keep the scheme effective in reducing fuel 
consumption, the regulatory agency should set reasonable amount of free permit 
allowance and regulate the permit price at an appropriate level. 
The key arguments lie in the fact that speculative behavior would not happen in 
the permit market. Future work should address the formulation of more realistic 
models. It is of vital significance to investigate how consumers would respond if 
gasoline permits could be banked and borrowed among different time periods 
(Fankhauser and Hepburn, 2010). And transactional cost is another issue the model 
could incorporate in the future (Fawcett and Parag, 2010). The model formulated here 

































                
(A1)  
Solving the optimization problem (A1) involves a linear program whose 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are 
1 1
1 20 0Gm m x p g g
α αα φ φ− −≤ ⊥ − − ≥                                    (A2) 
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10 (1 ) 0xx m x p
α αα φ−≤ ⊥ − − ≥                                         (A3)  








p gm c p x p Iφ g ψ
=
≤ ⊥ + + + − ≥∑
                             
(A5)  
20 0gmφ ψ w≤ ⊥ − − ≥                                              (A6) 
where ⊥  indicates orthogonality between two vectors, which in this case simply 
expresses the complementary slackness condition in linear programming (Zhao et al., 
2010; Chen et al., 2011). 
According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions we have 





G g x g
t
gp gp m p x I p cw g
=
+ + = + − ∑
                                
(A8)  
1 2 0gp φ φ− + =                                                      (A9) 








P p g gp W I p cw g
=
= + = + − ∑ . According to equations (A7), (A8) 
and (A9), we have  
( ) /m W Pα=                                                      (A11) 
/ xx W pβ=                                                       (A12)  
Substitute (A11) and (A12) into (A10), we have 
/g W Pψ α w= −                                                   (A13)  
Thus, the indirect utility function is 
( , , ) ( / )( / )x x xv P P W p p P W
αβ α β=                                    (A14) 
Appendix B 
To calculate the substitution effect, we need to obtain the Hicksian demand 
function. The optimization model for the consumer can be represented as follow. 
1
1




















                              
(B1) 
U is the minimum utility level required by the consumer. The 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for optimization problem (B1) are 




1 20 0Gm p g m x g
α αϕ α ϕ− −≤ ⊥ − + ≥                                    (B2)  
10 (1 ) 0xx p m x
α αϕ α −≤ ⊥ − − ≥                                        (B3)  
20 0gpψ ϕ≤ ⊥ − ≥                                                  (B4)  
10 0m x U
α βϕ≤ ⊥ − ≥                                              (B5) 
20 0gmϕ ψ w≤ ⊥ − + ≥                                               (B6)  
According to (B2) and (B3), we have  
/ / [ ( )]x G gm x p p g p gα β= +                                          (B7)  
Substitute (B7) into (B5), we have 
[ / ( )]xm U p P
βα β=  
Thus, the Hicksian demand function for the consumer is 
( , , ) [ / ( )]x xh P P U U P P
βα β=                                           (B8) 
 
Appendix C 
When **I I> , Since gY I p w= +  and gP p p c= + , we have 
/W P gw>                                                        (C1)  
Multiplying equation (C1) on both sides by 2gPα − , we have 
2 2 1WP g g Pα α w− −>                                                 (C2) 
Adding 2 2 2g P Wα −− on both sides in equation (C2), we have 
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2WP g g P W g P g P Wα α α w α− − − −− > −                       (C3) 
Therefore, according to equations (21) and (22), we have 
x xIE SE<                                                        (C4) 
Since 0ψ < , we have *I I< . Therefore, when ** *I I I< < , we have x xIE SE< .  
The case when **I I<  would be similar. 
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